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Abstract
In this work we present the first passive attack over the SASI lightweight
authentication protocol with modular rotations. This can be used to fully
recover the secret ID of the RFID tag, which is the value the protocol
is designed to conceal. The attack is described initially for recovering
⌊log2(96)⌋ = 6 bits of the secret value ID, a result that by itself allows
to mount traceability attacks on any given tag. However, the proposed
scheme can be extended to obtain any amount of bits of the secret ID,
provided a sufficiently large number of successful consecutive sessions are
eavesdropped. We also present results on the attack’s efficiency, and some
ideas to secure this version of the SASI protocol.
Index Terms – Cryptanalysis, RFID, authentication, SASI, protocol.
1 Introduction
In 2007 Hung-Yu Chien published a very interesting ultralightweight authen-
tication protocol providing Strong Authentication and Strong Integrity (SASI)
for very low-cost RFID tags [1].
This was a much needed answer to the increasing need for schemes providing
such properties in very constrained environments like RFID systems. As the
previous attempts to design ultralightweight protocols have failed (all proposals
have been broken), this new scheme was specially interesting.
As we will see later, the major difference between this proposal and existing
ones is the inclusion of the rotation operation. There has been, however, some
confusion over the concrete type of rotation recommended by the author. It is
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important to note that the way in which rotations should be performed is not
specified at all in the original paper [1]. So the first researchers to publish some
weaknesses (two desynchronization attacks) against the protocol [10] needed
to contact the author to clarify this issue. After a private communication,
the author stated that the rotation he intended to use in the protocol was
Rot(A,B) = A << wt(B), where wt(B) stands for the Hamming weight of
vector B.
That turned out to be a wise decision, as if he had decided to use the more
common rotation definition of Rot(A,B) = A << B mod N , he would have run
into the attack described in this paper. This latter version of the protocol, with
a modular rotation instead of a hamming weight rotation, is the one which is
analyzed in this work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe
the SASI protocol, then in Section 3 we introduce our attack. Finally, in Section
4 we extract some conclusions that could help in devising new and stronger
versions of this variant of the SASI protocol. The source code of a very simple
implementation of the attack can be found in the Appendix.
2 Description of the SASI Protocol
The SASI protocol is briefly described in the following, where R represents the
reader, T represents the tag, IDS stands for an index pseudonym, ID is tag’s
private identifier, Ki represent tag’s secret keys and n1 and n2 are nonces. The
ID is the most valuable information allowing the unequivocally identification of
tagged items, a property that is not provided by other consolidated identification
systems such as barcodes.
1. R→ T : hello
2. T → R : IDS
3. With IDS, the reader finds in the backend database the tag’s secret values
ID, K1, and K2.
4. R generates nonces n1 and n2 to construct messages A, B and C as follows
A = IDS ⊕K1 ⊕ n1
B = (IDS ∨K2) + n2
C = (K1 ⊕ K¯2) + (K2 ⊕ K¯1), where
K¯1 = Rot(K1 ⊕ n2,K1)
K¯2 = Rot(K2 ⊕ n1,K2)
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where ⊕ stands for the usual addition modulo 2, + represents addition
modulo 296, and ∨ is the usual bitwise or operation.
Finally, the reader sends to the tag the concatenation of A, B and C
R→ T : A‖B‖C
5. From A and B, respectively, the tag can obtain values n1 and n2. Then,
it locally computes C and checks if the result of its local computation is
equal to the sent value. If this were the case, it updates the values of IDS,
K1 and K2 in the following manner:
IDSnext = (IDS + ID)⊕ (n2 ⊕ K¯1)
Knext
1
= K¯1
Knext
2
= K¯2
6. T → R : D with
D = (K¯2 + ID)⊕ ((K1 ⊕K2) ∨ K¯1)
7. R verifies D and, if it is equal to the result of its local computation, it
updates IDS,K1 and K2 just as the tag.
3 Cryptanalysis of SASI with Modular Rota-
tions
Before presenting the cryptanalysis of SASI with modular rotations, we explain
the background and general assumptions in which the protocol is based.
3.1 Background
In 2006, Peris et al. proposed a family of Ultralightweight Mutual Authen-
tication Protocols (henceforth referred to as the UMAP family of protocols).
Chronologically, M2AP [2] was the first proposal, followed by EMAP [3] and
LMAP [4]. Although some vulnerabilities were discovered (active attacks [5, 6]
and later on passive attacks [7, 8]) which rendered those first proposals inse-
cure, they were an interesting advance in the field of lightweight cryptography
for low-cost RFID tags.
The SASI protocol is highly reminiscent of the UMAP family, and more
concretely, of the LMAP protocol.
Before the SASI proposal, however, all the messages exchanged over the inse-
cure radio channel were computed by the composition of very simple operations
such as addition modulo 2, addition modulo 296, and bitwise operations like OR
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and AND. This presented a major drawback, as all of these operations are tri-
angular functions (T-functions) [9]. That is, these functions have the property
that output bits only depend of the leftmost input bits, instead of all input bits.
Furthermore, the composition of triangular operations always results in a trian-
gular function. This undesirable characteristic greatly facilitated the analysis of
the messages transmitted in the UMAP family of protocols, and thus the work
of the cryptanalyst.
The main difference between LMAP and SASI is the inclusion of a non-
triangular function, such that the composition of all operations would no longer
be triangular. Specifically, rotation is now included in the set of operations
supported by the tag, which is reasonable assumption, as it can be performed
quite efficiently.
3.2 Analytical Results
The natural way of attacking this protocol is to consider what happens when
modular rotations are not performed, that is, when the amount of rotation
given by the second argument is zero modulo 96. For these cases, the proposed
protocol uses exactly the same set of operations that lead to the attacks over
the previous ultra lightweight protocols, that is, no triangular functions. This
should ease any analysis. Therefore:
K¯1 = Rot(K1 ⊕ n2,K1) = Rot(K1 ⊕ n2,K1 mod 96)
= Rot(K1 ⊕ n2, 0) = K1 ⊕ n2
(1)
Similarly,
K¯2 = Rot(K2 ⊕ n1,K2) = K2 ⊕ n1 (2)
This has a particularly nasty impact in the process of index pseudonym
(IDS) update, since
IDSnext = (IDS + ID)⊕ (n2 ⊕ K¯1)
= (IDS + ID)⊕ (n2 ⊕ K1 ⊕ n2)
= (IDS + ID)⊕K1
(3)
So we have that ID = IDSnext⊕K1− IDS and we can take full advantage
of the knowledge that K1 = K2 = 0 mod 96 to conclude that, with a probability
depicted in Table 1, only depending on the value of N (N = 96 in this case, but
other values could be used for recovering more bits) it holds that
ID mod 96 ≈ (IDSnext − IDS) mod 96 (4)
As both values IDSnext and IDS are public and easily observable by snoop-
ing at two consecutive authentication sessions, this relation allows us to recover
the ⌊log2(96)⌋ = 6 less significant bits of the secret ID and, analogously, to
perform a traceability attack over the .
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The only question that remains is how to recognize when the conditions
K1 = 0 mod 96 and K2 = 0 mod 96 hold simultaneously, since K1 and K2 are
secrets that only the tag and the reader should know. Fortunately, this is pos-
sible by checking if certain relations (that only involve public values) hold.
Let us suppose that K1 = K2 = 0 mod 96 then
K¯1 = Rot(K1 ⊕ n2,K1) = Rot(K1 ⊕ n2, 0) = K1 ⊕ n2 (5)
K¯2 = Rot(K2 ⊕ n1,K2) = Rot(K2 ⊕ n1, 0) = K2 ⊕ n1 (6)
So
C = (K1 ⊕ K¯2) + (K2 ⊕ K¯1)
= K1 ⊕K2 ⊕ n1 +K2 ⊕K1 ⊕ n2
(7)
which implies that
C mod 96 = K1 ⊕K2 ⊕ n1 +K2 ⊕K1 ⊕ n2 mod 96
≈ n1 + n2 mod 96.
(8)
The value of n1 + n2 mod 96 can also be probabilistically obtained from the
observed values of public messages A, B and IDS because:
A = IDS ⊕K1 ⊕ n1 ⇒ n1 = A⊕ IDS ⊕K1 (9)
and then we can get that
n1 mod 96 = A⊕ IDS ⊕K1 mod 96
≈ A⊕ IDS mod 96
(10)
because, by hypothesis, K1 = 0 mod 96
Similarly, we can obtain that, as B = (IDS ∨K2) + n2, then
n2 ≈ (B − IDS) mod 96 (11)
All in all, we can conclude that if K1 = K2 = 0 mod 96 then, with a
probability given in Table 1
C mod 96 ≈ n1 + n2 mod 96
≈ (A⊕ IDS) + (B − IDS) mod 96
(12)
so what is only left is to passively snoop multiple authentication sessions and,
for each one, verify if the above condition holds. If this is the case, one
should compute the value (IDSnext − IDS) mod 96 and from this, approxi-
mate ID mod 96.
Only one last tweak is needed to perform a successful attack: Just by chance,
the above relation will be true even if the two preconditions K1 = 0 mod 96 and
K2 = 0 mod 96 are not simultaneously true, and this will lead us to a possibly
wrong estimation for ID mod 96.
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Table 1: Probabilities of Equations 4, 8, 10, 11 and 12 simultaneously holding
for different values of N , given that K1 = K2 = 0 mod N
N 2t 3 · 2t 4 · t+ 10 2 · t+ 5
Probability 1.00 0.33 2 ·N−1 N−1
1. For i = 0 to 96
2. Observations[i] = 0
3. Repeat a sufficiently high number of times N the following steps:
4. Observe an authentication session and get IDS, A, B and C
5. Check if for these values it holds that C = (A⊕ IDS) + (B − IDS) mod 96
6. If this is not the case, go to step 4.
7. Perform the following tasks:
8. Wait for the authentication session to finish.
9. Send the tag a hello message to obtain IDSnext.
10. Compute c = (IDSnext − IDS) mod 96
11. Increment Observations[c]
12. Find m, the maximum of the values in Observations[i].
13. Conjecture that m = ID mod 96.
Fig. 2. Outline of the attack.
This is, however, easily fixable by simply observing many values of (IDSnext−
IDS) mod 96 when equation (12) holds, because the true value of ID mod 96
will likely be the most common.
This fact has been experimentally verified and leads to the attack schemat-
ically described in Fig. 2.
3.3 Efficiency analysis
The attack presented could be performed not only for recovering ⌊log2(96)⌋ bits
of the secret value ID, but also works for other modulus, with varying prob-
abilities as shown in Table 1. In particular, the set of probabilistic equations
(i.e. equations 4, 8, 10, 11, 12) all hold with probability one for modulus that
are a power of 2, so this allows for more efficient attacks able of obtaining much
more bits (i.e. log2(256) = 8, log2(512) = 9, log2(1024) = 10, etc.) if needed.
In these cases, we naturally need to observe more authentication sessions for
recovering more ID bits.
As a rule of thumb we have concluded, after extensive experimentation,
that an attacker following this procedure is on average able of recovering the
⌊log2(S)⌋ least significant bits of ID after observing around θ(S) authentication
sessions.
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4 Concluding Remarks
In this article we have presented an attack against a variant of a novel and quite
interesting ultralightweight authentication protocol.
We analyze the SASI protocol under the assumption that the most common
rotation definition (i.e. modular rotation) is employed. This analysis points
out that the inclusion of the rotation operation (a non-triangular function) is a
necessary but by itself not sufficient condition to achieve security in lightweight
protocols. It also highlights the advantages of the hamming rotation over the
modular rotation here explored, namely that the former is much less likely to
behave like the identity. This could be a good reason to lead future designers
of ultralightweight protocols towards a preference for the hamming over the
modular rotation.
We have to acknowledge, however, that the proposed attack is not successful
against the hamming rotation as advocated by the author of the protocol. To
day, authors do not know any other passive attack against the SASI protocol
or its modular variant. Active attacks, on the other hand, abound both against
the hamming and against the modular version of the protocol. First, Sun et al.
proposed to desynchronization attacks. Then, in [11] it was proposaed a denial-
of-service and traceability attack. Recently, D’Arco et al. proposed another
desynchronization attack [12], an identity disclosure attack, and finally a full
disclosure attack against modular SASI.
Some different design decisions would, on the other hand, have considerably
harden our attack, and we will briefly describe then in the following:
• The IDS updating could be improved as it is dependant of n2 and K¯1
which is again a function of n2. This is instrumental in our attack and, in
any case, leads to all sorts of bad statistical properties.
• The definitions of K¯1 and K¯2 should be rethought, as in the current
way there is a kind of distributive property (K¯1 = Rot(K1 ⊕ n2,K1) =
Rot(K1,K1)⊕Rot(n2,K1) ) that could ease attacks.
This can be avoided by, for example, using addition instead of xor as the
inner operator, although part of the problem still remains. The ideal solu-
tion should be to devise a more complex key scheduling, but of course this
will have an additional cost in terms of gate equivalents and performance.
• The use of the bitwise OR operation should be performed with extreme
care, as the resulting messages are strongly biased.
As an example, in the current protocol definition n2 could be approxi-
mated simply by computing n2 ≈ B − 1.
Message D suffers from a similar problem. The use of a bitwise AND
operation would produce similar undesirable effects. Past experience with
other lightweight protocols has shown that these two operators should only
be included in the inner parts of the algorithm, and every effort should
be made to disguise their output into seemingly random output when
constructing public messages such as B and D.
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In fact, an even more general version of this attack is possible. This alter-
native is, on the other hand, significantly less efficient than the attack scheme
described here. It consists simply in observing and storing the different values
of equation 4 (regular rotations is assumed again). In a well-designed protocol,
these should approximately follow a uniform distribution, but we have experi-
mentally observed that this is far from being the case. Following this extremely
simple approach, with no approximations nor preconditions, we are able to re-
cover up to 4 bits of the secret ID after around 210 authentication sessions
with a 100% success probability, a fact that could lead to a very straightforward
tracking attack.
Finally, we can conclude that the SASI protocol is indeed an interesting step
in the right direction towards fully secure ultralightweight protocols, and that
the decision about what type of rotations to employ was a correct one because
if modular rotations were used instead, the resulting protocol will fall short of
the security requirements typically needed in these schemes.
Appendix A: Attack’s source code
This is the source code of our attack, implemented in Python
#Traceability & recovery attack against the Modular SASI
#Ultralightweight Authentication Protocol
from random import *
from scipy import *
NumExperiments=2**18
def wt(a):
w=0
while a:
if a%2: w=w+1
a=a>>1
return w
def rot(a,b):
return ((((a << b) % 2**96) | (a >> (96-b)) % 2**96)) % 2**96
def sasiprotocol(L):
IDS, SID, N1, N2, K1, K2 = L[0], L[1], L[2], L[3], L[4], L[5]
A=IDS^K1^N1
B=((IDS | K2)+ N2) % 2**96
K1hat=rot(K1^N2, K1%96)
K2hat=rot(K2^N1, K2%96)
C=((K1^K2hat)+(K2^K1hat)) % 2**96
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D=((K2hat+SID)% 2**96)^((K1^K2)|K1hat)
IDSnext=((IDS+SID)%2**96)^(N2^K1hat)
O = [A%2**96, B%2**96, C%2**96, D%2**96, IDSnext%2**96, K1hat%2**96, K2hat%2**96]
return O
#The secret value we will try to obtain is I[1]=SID
I=[]
for i in range(6):
I.append(randint(0,(2**96)-1))
#Keep the value of I for the future, so copy it on nI and only manipulate wI
wI=I
Observations=[]
for i in range(96):
Observations.append(0)
j=0
for i in range(NumExperiments):
O=sasiprotocol(wI)
#Get IDS
IDS=wI[0]
#Get A, B, C
A=O[0]
B=O[1]
C=O[2]
#Check if it holds that C=(A^IDS)+(B-IDS)%96
if (C%96==((A^IDS)+(B-IDS))%96):
j=j+1
#Obtain the value of IDSnext
IDSnext=O[4]
#Compute c=(IDSnext-IDS)%96
c=(IDSnext-IDS)%96
Observations[c]=Observations[c]+1
#Then, a new protocol session begins
wI=[O[4],wI[1],randint(0,(2**96)-1),randint(0,(2**96)-1),O[5],O[6]]
#Print Observations & Compute the maximum
max=0
for i in range(96):
print "The value ", i, "has been observed ", Observations[i], "times"
if (Observations[i]>max):
max=Observations[i]
maxindex=i
print "The probability of a useful session is, approx.=1/",NumExperiments/j*(1.0)
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print "The maximum value, and our guess for SID%96 is ", maxindex
print "The correct value of SID%96 is ", I[1]%96
print "The difference between this values is", abs(I[1]%96-maxindex)
#This difference is always a power of two meaning that
#the least significant bits of our guess were correct
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